3.6.6.
Het EHRM refereert in paragraaf 168 van zijn arrest naar de algemene uitgangspunten die het EHRM in de Hutchinson tegen het Verenigd Koninkrijk heeft geformuleerd. Ik zal deze voor het lezersgemak hieronder citeren:
‘’(a) General principles laid down in the Court’s case-law
168. The general principles established in the Court’s case-law on life sentences have been summarised, quite recently, in Hutchinson v. the United Kingdom ([GC], no. 57592/08, §§ 42-45, 17 January 2017) and read as follows:
“42. The relevant principles, and the conclusions to be drawn from them, are set out at length in the Vinter judgment (cited above, §§ 103-122; recently summarised in Murray v. the Netherlands [GC], no. 10511/10, §§ 99-100, ECHR 2016). The Convention does not prohibit the imposition of a life sentence on those convicted of especially serious crimes, such as murder. Yet to be compatible with Article 3 such a sentence must be reducible de jure and de facto, meaning that there must be both a prospect of release for the prisoner and a possibility of review. The basis of such review must extend to assessing whether there are legitimate penological grounds for the continuing incarceration of the prisoner. These grounds include punishment, deterrence, public protection and rehabilitation. The balance between them is not necessarily static and may shift in the course of a sentence, so that the primary justification for detention at the outset may not be so after a lengthy period of service of sentence. The importance of the ground of rehabilitation is underlined, since it is here that the emphasis of European penal policy now lies, as reflected in the practice of the Contracting States, in the relevant standards adopted by the Council of Europe, and in the relevant international materials (Vinter and Others, cited above, §§ 59-81).
43. As recently stated by the Court, in the context of Article 8 of the Convention, ‘emphasis on rehabilitation and reintegration has become a mandatory factor that the member States need to take into account in designing their penal policies’ (Khoroshenko v. Russia [GC], no. 41418/04, § 121, ECHR 2015; see also the cases referred to in Murray, cited above, § 102). Similar considerations apply under Article 3, given that respect for human dignity requires prison authorities to strive towards a life sentenced prisoner’s rehabilitation (see Murray, cited above, §§ 103-104). It follows that the requisite review must take account of the progress that the prisoner has made towards rehabilitation, assessing whether such progress has been so significant that continued detention can no longer be justified on legitimate penological grounds (Vinter and Others, cited above, §§ 113-116). A review limited to compassionate grounds is therefore insufficient (ibid., § 127).
44. The criteria and conditions laid down in domestic law that pertain to the review must have a sufficient degree of clarity and certainty, and also reflect the relevant case-law of the Court. Certainty in this area is not only a general requirement of the rule of law but also underpins the process of rehabilitation which risks being impeded if the procedure of sentence review and the prospects of release are unclear or uncertain. Therefore prisoners who receive a whole life sentence are entitled to know from the outset what they must do in order to be considered for release and under what conditions. This includes when a review of sentence will take place or may be sought (Vinter and Others, cited above, § 122). In this respect the Court has noted clear support in the relevant comparative and international materials for a review taking place no later than twenty-five years after the imposition of sentence, with periodic reviews thereafter (ibid., §§ 68, 118, 119 and 120). It has however also indicated that this is an issue coming within the margin of appreciation that must be accorded to Contracting States in the matters of criminal justice and sentencing (ibid., §§ 104, 105 and 120).
45. As for the nature of the review, the Court has emphasised that it is not its task to prescribe whether it should be judicial or executive, having regard to the margin of appreciation that must be accorded to Contracting States (Vinter and Others, cited above, § 120). It is therefore for each State to determine whether the review of sentence is conducted by the executive or the judiciary.”
3.6.7.
Bij de toepassing van de hiervoor gemelde uitgangspunten op de zaak zelf overweegt het EHRM onder andere het volgende:
172. The Court notes that the procedure for dealing with requests for clemency is set out in the Clemency Procedure Regulations, approved by a presidential decree to that effect. Among the considerations to be taken into account during the examination of a request for clemency, the regulations refer to “the seriousness of the committed crime, the duration of the sentence already served, the character of the convict, his or her behaviour, the existence of sincere repentance, compensation for or redress of the damage caused, as well as family-related and other circumstances” (…)
173. In the Court’s opinion, the above considerations provide some guidance as to the criteria and conditions for review of a life sentence and could be construed as referring to legitimate penological grounds for the continuing incarceration of prisoners (see and compare with Bodein v. France, no. 40014/10, § 60, 13 November 2014, Murray v. the Netherlands [GC], no. 10511/10, § 100, 26 April 2016, as well as Harakchiev and Tolumov v. Bulgaria, nos. 15018/11 and 61199/12, § 258, ECHR 2014 (extracts), and the Court’s further analysis in Hutchinson, cited above, § 61). It is noteworthy, however, that those considerations are applicable in the context of a broader restriction. Namely, the Clemency Procedure Regulations state that “persons convicted for serious or particularly serious crimes, or having two or more criminal records in respect of the commission of premeditated crimes ... may be granted clemency in exceptional cases and subject to extraordinary circumstances” (see paragraph 86 above). All life prisoners clearly fall within this category (see paragraph 76 above). It is not known what is meant by “exceptional cases” and “extraordinary circumstances”, and there is nothing to suggest that the penological grounds for keeping someone in prison are of relevance for the interpretation of those notions under the legal frameworks as they presently stand in Ukraine.
174. In other words, prisoners who receive a whole life sentence do not know from the outset what they must do in order to be considered for release and under what conditions (see Vinter and Others, cited above, § 122, and Hutchinson, also cited above, § 44).
175. The Court also takes note of the Government’s submission that as of April 2016 there were no life prisoners in Ukraine eligible for presidential clemency, given that the twenty years’ “waiting” period was to be calculated from 2000 when life imprisonment had been introduced in Ukraine and would therefore not expire until 2020 (see paragraph 166 above). However, according to the information provided by the head of the Clemency Department during a media briefing on 6 July 2016, by June 2016 more than seventy life prisoners had already served the required minimum of twenty years in prison and forty of them had requested presidential clemency, but their requests had been rejected (see paragraph 91 above). Such a drastic discrepancy in the authorities’ interpretation of the twenty-year “waiting” period is another indication for the Court of the lack of sufficient clarity and certainty in the applicable criteria and conditions for a life-sentence review under the presidential clemency procedure.
176. Against that background, the Court is inclined to accept the applicant’s argument that the calculation of the twenty-five years’ imprisonment replacing a life sentence as a result of presidential clemency might be open to different interpretations too.
(…)
177. The Court further observes that the procedure in Ukraine requires neither the Clemency Commission nor the President to give reasons in their decisions regarding requests for clemency. The Court has held in its case-law that transparency of a life sentence review may nonetheless be ensured by other means, such as, for example, the established requirement for the Clemency Commission to take account of the relevant case-law of international courts and other bodies on the interpretation and application of international human rights in force in respect of the State in question, and to publish activity reports on a regular basis detailing the examination of requests for clemency (see Hutchinson, cited above, § 61). No such information is made public in Ukraine, except for the general outline of the criteria relevant for the examination of requests for clemency (see paragraph 86 above), to demonstrate how, if at all, those criteria are applied in practice by the President of Ukraine.
(…)
178. The Court acknowledges that having regard to the margin of appreciation which must be accorded to Contracting States in matters of criminal justice and sentencing, it is not its task to prescribe the form (executive or judicial) such a review should take (see paragraph 168 above). It nevertheless considers that in order to guarantee proper consideration of the changes and the progress towards rehabilitation made by a life prisoner, however significant they might be, the review should entail either the executive giving reasons or a judicial review, so that even the appearance of arbitrariness is avoided (see Matiošaitis and Others, cited above, § 181, with further case-law references).
179. In the present case the absence of an obligation on the President of Ukraine and his subordinate authorities to give reasons in their decisions on clemency requests is further aggravated by the lack of any judicial review of those decisions. In such circumstances, the exercise by life prisoners of their right to a review of their life sentence by way of presidential clemency cannot be regarded as surrounded by sufficient procedural guarantees (see Murray, cited above, § 100).
180. Therefore, in the light of the above considerations, the Court considers that in Ukraine the presidential power of clemency is a modern-day equivalent of the royal prerogative of mercy, based on the principle of humanity, rather than a mechanism, based on penological grounds and with adequate procedural safeguards, for review of a prisoner’s situation so that the adjustment of his or her life sentence could be obtained (see and compare with Matiošaitis and Others, cited above, § 173).
181. The Court also reiterates that European penal policy currently places emphasis on the rehabilitative aim of imprisonment, even in the case of life prisoners (see, for example, Matiošaitis and Others, cited above, § 163). Life prisoners are to be provided with an opportunity to rehabilitate themselves. As to the extent of any obligations incumbent on States in this regard, the Court considers that even though States are not responsible for achieving the rehabilitation of life prisoners, they nevertheless have a duty to make it possible for such prisoners to rehabilitate themselves. Were it otherwise, a life prisoner could in effect be denied the possibility of rehabilitation, with the consequence that the review required for a life sentence to be reducible, in which a life prisoner’s progress towards rehabilitation is to be assessed, might never be genuinely capable of leading to the commutation, remission or termination of the life sentence or to the conditional release of the prisoner. The obligation to offer a possibility of rehabilitation is to be seen as an obligation of means, not one of result. However, it entails a positive obligation to secure prison regimes to life prisoners which are compatible with the aim of rehabilitation and enable such prisoners to make progress towards their rehabilitation In this context the Court has previously held that such an obligation exists in situations where it is the prison regime or the conditions of detention which obstruct rehabilitation (see Murray, cited above, § 104, with further references). [onderstreping AG TS].
182. The Court notes that life prisoners in Ukraine are segregated from other prisoners and spend up to twenty-three hours per day in their cells, which are usually double or triple occupancy, with little in terms of organised activities and association (see paragraphs 83 and 107 above). The Government have failed to explain how a prisoner can progress towards rehabilitation in such conditions.
183. The Court also notes that the Government’s observations in the present case did not even mention the issue of social rehabilitation for life prisoners.
184. Consequently, the Court cannot but conclude that the existing regime for life prisoners in Ukraine is incompatible with the aim of rehabilitation. (…)’’
3.6.9.
Deze zaak biedt inzicht in hoe het EHRM de criteria, die laatstelijk in de zaak Hutchinson tegen het Verenigd Koninkrijk zijn geformuleerd, toepast. Daar waar het gaat om voorzienbaarheid en helderheid van de procedure, het vereiste om beslissingen die betrekking hebben op het voortduren of bekorten van een levenslange gevangenisstraf te motiveren, de vereisten die aan een detentieregime kunnen worden gesteld waarin de levenslanggestrafte zich bevindt, en de mogelijkheid van rechterlijke toetsing, kunnen aan deze uitspraak naar mijn mening geen argumenten worden ontleend dat de Nederlandse regeling in strijd zou zijn met art. 3 EVRM. De Nederlandse regeling voldoet, althans op papier en dus de jure, aan de vereisten die kunnen worden afgeleid uit de toetsing van het EHRM in de zaak Petukhov tegen de Oekraïne. Of dat ook de facto het geval is, zal zoals hiervoor al is opgemerkt nog moeten blijken. Ik meen dat het te vroeg is om hierover al een oordeel te vellen.