Uitspraken

Windward c.s. hebben na wijziging van eis geconcludeerd dat de Ondernemingskamer het Vonnis gedeeltelijk zal vernietigen en opnieuw rechtdoende, samengevat,

vorderingen van Windward:

1. Junzheng zal veroordelen tot betaling van $ 1 miljoen, te vermeerderen met de contractuele rente ex artikel 18.3.2 van de Share Purchase Agreement (hierna ook: SPA) vanaf 31 augustus 2020 tot de dag van volledige betaling;

2. de veroordeling van Junzheng tot betaling van $ 843.164 te vermeerderen met de wettelijke rente vanaf 31 augustus 2021 tot de dag van volledige betaling, alsnog uitvoerbaar bij voorraad zal verklaren, en Junzheng zal veroordelen tot betaling van de contractuele rente ex artikel 18.3.2 SPA vanaf 31 augustus 2021 tot de dag van volledige betaling;

3. Junzheng zal veroordelen tot overname van de door Windward gehouden aandelen in het kapitaal van NST tegen betaling van een door de Ondernemingskamer vast te stellen prijs en Junzheng daarbij zal veroordelen tot betaling van een billijke verhoging van deze prijs en:

a. primair de prijs en de billijke verhoging vast zal stellen op $ 2.245.00, te vermeerderen met de wettelijke rente vanaf 30 augustus 2019;

b. subsidiair de prijs en de billijke verhoging vast zal stellen op een na een deskundigenbericht vast te stellen bedrag, te vermeerderen met de wettelijke rente vanaf 30 augustus 2019;

4. NST zal veroordelen tot betaling van de management fee van € 20.000 per maand, vanaf 1 juli 2021 tot en met de maand waarin Junzheng zal hebben voldaan aan het onder 3 gevorderde;

5. NST zal veroordelen tot terugbetaling van de Shareholders’ Loan van $ 45.292,01, te vermeerderen met de contractuele enkelvoudige rente vanaf 30 augustus 2019 tot de dag van volledige betaling;

6. Junzheng zal veroordelen in de proceskosten in beide instanties, waaronder de kosten van beslaglegging;

7. de Interim Agreement zal vernietigen;

8. artikel 3.3.3 SPA zal vernietigen;

9. de besluiten van de algemene vergadering van NST van 5 november 2020, inhoudende dat NST “requires new capital of 4 million Euros for investment or otherwise”, zal vernietigen;

vorderingen van [A] :

10. de besluiten van het bestuur van NST van 25 november 2020 om [A] te schorsen als uitvoerend bestuurder van NST en de Management Agreement te beëindigen zal vernietigen;

11. NST zal veroordelen tot betaling aan [A] van de kosten van deze procedure in beide instanties.

Windward en Sinochem hebben vervolgens op 28 juni 2019 een Interim Agreement gesloten. Deze overeenkomst luidt voor zover hier van belang:

“(…)

This Interim Agreement is in addition to the Binding Offer Letter. The Binding Offer Letter and the Letter Agreement Exclusivity will continue to be in full force and effect. Definitions used in this Interim Agreement shall have the meaning attributed to them in the Binding Offer Letter, unless such definitions have been explicitly defined in this Interim Agreement.

(…)

Attached to this Interim Agreement as Annex 1 is a term sheet outlining the main terms and conditions as are resulting from and agreed upon during the Meetings. Those terms and conditions are not exhaustive and may inter alia be subject to change by mutual agreement of the Parties and subject to reaching agreement and execution of a definitive legally binding SPA and all related transaction documents (including the SHA and all such other documents together: The Transaction Documents). Where there is any discrepancy between the content of this Interim Agreement or the Term Sheet attached hereto of the one part, and the Binding Offer Letter and the Drafts of the other part, the former shall override and prevail.

(…)

As per the date of this Interim Agreement, the Seller confirms that it does not have any other claims (actual or contingent) of any nature whatsoever on the Purchaser (in this respect the Parties acknowledge that this Interim Agreement qualifies as a so-called ‘vaststellingsovereenkomst’ as meant in section 7:900 Dutch Civil Code) and the Seller undertakes to forthwith unconditionally and permanently withdraw the arbitration as initiated by the Seller with the ICC under reference number 24517/FS and commits not to resume the same or any similar course of action against the Purchaser in connection with the Proposed Transaction or otherwise before the Long Stop Date or mutually agreed extension thereof. The Seller commits not to bring up the same or any similar course of action against the Purchaser once the Proposed Transaction is finalized.

(…)”.

Annex 1 bij de Interim Agreement luidt voor zover hier van belang:

“(…)

(…)”.

Op 2 augustus 2019 is ter uitvoering van de Interim Agreement tussen Windward en Junzheng een Share Purchase Agreement (SPA) tot stand gekomen. Op grond van deze overeenkomst heeft Windward 75% van haar aandelen in NST verkocht aan Junzheng. De SPA, waarin Windward wordt aangeduid als ‘Seller’, Junzheng als ‘Purchaser’ en NST als ‘Company’, luidt voor zover hier van belang:

“(…)

3 PURCHASE PRICE

Payment of the Purchase Price

The Purchase Price shall be paid as follows:

Payment) shall be paid in cash as follows: (i) 50% (…) (USD 1,000,000 (…) on the first anniversary of the Completion Date, and (ii) 50% (…) (USD 1,000,000 (…) on the second anniversary of the Completion Date, in each case subject to any claims or set-off by the Purchaser pursuant to the terms of this Agreement;

(…)

Security

(…)

Adjustment

Within 5 (five) Business Days after the Cash, Debt and Working Capital at Completion having been finally agreed or determined (…) the Seller or the Purchaser as the case may be shall ensure that the amount, if any, by which the Initial Purchase Price calculated on the basis of the pre-Completion estimates of the Cash, Debt and Working Capital at Completion exceeds or is lower than the Purchase Price calculated on the basis of the actual Cash, Debt and Working Capital at Completion is paid to the Purchaser or the Seller as the case may be.

(…)

Entire agreement

This Agreement (together with the other Transaction Documents) represents the entire

understanding, and constitutes the whole agreement, in relation to the Transaction and replaces any prior agreement including undertakings, arrangements, offer letters, understandings or statements of any nature (whether or not in writing) between the Parties with respect thereto. In the event of a conflict between the provisions of this Agreement and the aforementioned confidentiality agreement, this Agreement shall prevail. It is acknowledged that the main body of the Interim Agreement, and specifically article 9 thereof, will continue to be in full force and effect.

(…)”.

Op 30 augustus 2019 is tevens een Shareholders’ Agreement (hierna: SHA) gesloten tussen Windward, Junzheng, STAK NST, [A] en NST, waarbij [A] werd benoemd tot uitvoerend bestuurder van NST. Ook zijn er twee niet-uitvoerende bestuurders benoemd. De SHA, waarin Windward is aanduid als ‘Windward Holding’, Junzheng als ‘JZ Logistics’, NST als ‘Company’ en [A] als ‘Manager’, luidt voor zover hier van belang:

“(…)

Bad Leaver Events means, in relation to the Manager:

(...)

following reasons:

(i) for urgent cause (dringende reden) as meant in Section 7:678 DCC, whether or not the Manager or Windward Holding has an employment relationship with the Company;

(ii) for any of the reasonable grounds (redelijke grond) set out in Section 7:669 sub 3 under d up to and including f DCC, whether or not the Manager or Windward Holding has an employment relationship with the Company;

Op 5 november 2020 heeft een aandeelhoudersvergadering van NST plaatsgevonden. Op die vergadering hebben de aandeelhouders bij gewone meerderheid (Junzheng en STAK NST) besloten dat NST nieuw kapitaal nodig heeft ten bedrage van € 4 miljoen. De notulen van deze aandeelhoudersvergadering luiden voor zover hier van belang:

“(…)

2. The company requires new capital for investments or otherwise.

As proposed by JUNZHENG LOGISTICS, considering the imminent financial difficulties and sustainable development of the company, it should be discussed and decided that the company requires new capital for investments or otherwise (as meant in art. 3.3.3 SPA). For that purpose, a capital increase of EUR 4,000,000 (4 million Euros) shall be injected into the Company by way of share premium. This contribution shall be made by JUNZHENG LOGISTICS and WINDWARD on a pro-rata basis, i.e. EUR 2,900,000 (2.9 million Euros) from JUNZHENG LOGISTICS, EUR 1,000,000 (1 million Euros) from WINDWARD, and EUR 100,000 (100 thousand Euros) from STAK.

(…)”.

Een e-mail van Junzheng aan Windward van 18 november 2020 luidt voor zover hier van belang:

“(…)

Following the General Meeting of NST on 5th November 2020, we will now have to proceed with the execution of those two shareholders' resolutions adopted therein. (…)

The second resolution resolved that NST requires new capital of 4 million Euros for investment or otherwise to cope with current financial difficulty and serve as working capital for NST’s future development (…). The execution of this new capital injection in NST is done by way of share premium, provided by Windward and Junzheng on a pro-rata basis, i.e. EUR 1,000,000 from Windward and 2,900,000 from Junzheng.

In this regard, Junzheng has chosen to rely on art. 3.3.3 SPA. This means that the aforementioned capital injection of EUR 1,000,000 from Windward into NST will be fulfilled by Junzheng on Windward' s behalf and this constitutes fulfillment by Junzheng of its payment obligation vis-à-vis Windward in relation to the first Deferred Payment (as set out in art. 3.3.3. SPA). To be clear, Junzheng’s own capital injection of EUR 2,900,000 constitutes the pro-rata own investment as set out in art. 3.3.3. SPA. (…)”.

Bij besluit van 17 mei 2021 heeft de algemene vergadering van aandeelhouders van NST bij gewone meerderheid [A] als uitvoerend bestuurder ontslagen. De notulen van deze vergadering luiden voor zover hier van belang:

“(…)

2. Dismissal of [ [A] ] as Executive Director

Junzheng Logistics proposed to dismiss [ [A] ] as Executive Director. The reasons for the dismissal were [ [A] ] mismanagement and conflict of interest being irreconcilable differences.

The details are as follows:

(…)

2) (…) [ [A] ] has major conflict of interest with NST. On the one hand, when NST faces a large amount of debt, [ [A] ] chooses to pay back the debts of its affiliated companies first, ignoring the debts of major shareholders, which makes the interest and penalty interest payable by NST increase greatly (…). On the other hand, [ [A] ] who urgently requires the increase of NST capital to promote NST development, refuses to apply the deferred payment to NST's capital increase in accordance with SPA. [ [A] ] puts the interests of small shareholder before the interests of NST. As the executive director of NST, [ [A] ] had significant conflicts of interest when managing the company.

(…)

The General Meeting has passed the resolution with simple majority to decide that [ [A] ] is dismissed as executive director.

(…)”.